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Abstract
In this paper, we theoretically explore the implications of social norms in deterring
pollution standard fraud along with economic incentives provided both by markets and
regulatory activities. The model assumes that a large number of risk-averse individuals
di⁄er not only in their private cost of compliance with the environmental standard but
also in their individual aversion to fraud. The aversion of fraud is in￿ uenced by the extent
of social norms. We show that there may be multiple equilibrium rates of compliance for
a given enforcement policy. We also show that under risk aversion the potential loss in
market revenues has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the equilibrium rates of compliance. Simi-
larly, increasing the probability of audit may decrease the equilibrium rate of compliance
when stochastic events make unvoluntary non compliance possible. Last, we show that
the information brought to the market is crucial for polluters￿behavior. For this, we
explore the impact of self-reporting procedures and public disclosure of criminal records.
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11 Introduction
Human behavior seems to be in￿ uenced both by economic incentives and social norms. While
economists have largely emphasized economic incentives, social norms have been largely ne-
glected although this is a major topic in other social sciences like sociology (Ellickson 1998,
Elster 1989, Posner 1997). It is only recently that some economists have analyzed the eco-
nomic consequences of social norms and status seeking in societies (see e.g. Akerlof 1980 for
a seminal paper and more recently Lindbeck et al. 1999). The basic idea is that individuals
when considering decisions not only take into account the private economic incentives (for
example, the expected penalty when being non compliant with respect to an environmental
standard) but also the intensity of social norms against certain actions. In other words,
individual decisions can be in￿ uenced by the aggregate behavior observed in the population.
Recently, Lai et al. (2003) have suggested that the presence of social norms may explain
why one observes that a surprisingly large number of ￿rms comply with pollution standards
even though expected penalties for non compliance are low (see Russell, Harrington and
Vaughan, 1986, for evidence in the US and Livernois and McKenna, 1999, for the Canadian
case). Cropper and Oates (1992) suggest that ￿perhaps public opprobrium is a stronger
disciplinary force than economists are typically inclined to believe￿ . Hatcher et al. (2000)
have empirically explored social norms in the context of compliance in ￿sheries. Various
papers have analyzed the role of non-economic motivations for being compliant with pollution
standards: both Bontems and Rotillon (2000) and Heyes (2001) assume the existence of an
exogenous proportion of ￿rms that always comply and show that increasing this proportion
may have adverse impacts on welfare.
The purpose of the paper proposed here is to theoretically explore the implications of
social norms in deterring pollution standard fraud along with economic incentives. The
model assumes that a large number of risk-averse individuals di⁄er not only in their private
cost of compliance with the environmental standard but also in their individual aversion to
2fraud. The aversion of fraud is in￿ uenced by the extent of social norms: if the rate of fraud
is rationally expected to be high then the individual cost of being caught while being non
compliant is low ceteris paribus. And conversely. This contrasts with Bontems and Rotillon
(2000) and Heyes (2001) by endogenizing the compliance decisions not only through the
economic incentives provided both by regulatory activities and by markets, but also through
the presence of social norms against frauding behavior.
The analysis yields to multiple instable or stable equilibria for a given enforcement policy
(i.e. for a given penalty and rate of inspection). This explains why some gradual change in
policy may cause a sudden and drastic move in the value that individuals attach to the norm.
We also show that under risk aversion the potential loss in market revenues has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on the equilibrium rates of compliance. Similarly, increasing the probability of audit
may decrease the equilibrium rate of compliance when stochastic events make unvoluntary
non compliance possible.
Last, we concentrate on the situation where besides penalties non compliant individuals
may also su⁄er from market sanctions. The model assumes that consumers are ready to pay
a premium to obtain unobservable environmental attributes. In a context where imperfectly
informed consumers on the ￿green￿market are able to form rational expectations regarding
the extent of illicit activities, multiplicity of equilibria is also obtained. This yields to several
interesting results. First, it is necessary for the regulator to distinguish voluntary from
involuntary non compliance. Second, the amount of information provided to the market
by the regulator (through identifying non compliant products) is crucial and there exist
some conditions for which providing information to the market through public disclosure of
criminal records is welfare decreasing. Last, incorporating the possibility for non compliant
￿rms to self-report their status before any inspection allows to save audit costs but also
modify the rational expectations of consumers in a sense which is not always desired by a
welfare-maximizing regulator.
32 The model
We consider a continuum population of risk-averse individuals, where each individual faces
a binary choice: whether or not to engage into compliance with regards to an (exogenous)
environmental law (or standard). The cost of compliance is c but we assume that compliance
is stochastic from the individual￿ s point of view. Indeed, with probability ￿, the individ-
ual that has spent the compliance cost c will be non compliant in the end due to external
circumstances. Also, we assume that there is no chance that an individual that has chosen
not to spend c will be found compliant. If we denote p the probability of being audited and
convicted, then the probability of being found non compliant while having spent the cost c
is ￿p.
In order to induce individuals to conform to the standard, the regulator imposes a penalty
upon non-compliant agents. With probability p, the individual who has not spent c has to
pay a ￿ne F through random audits. However, we allow the regulator to distinguish between
unvoluntary non compliance from voluntary non compliance by imposing a ￿ne f ￿ F to
the formers. Such a ￿ne might be needed in cases where a compensation to the victims of
violation even if unvoluntary is to be paid.
We denote ￿ the expected (and actual) rate of compliance in the population. Besides the
incentives brought by the regulator, we introduce also the possibility that individuals may
su⁄er from a loss in market revenue if found non compliant. Assume that an individual who
is found non compliant and convicted gets a market revenue equal to V = r ￿ ￿ where r ￿ 0
is the potential maximal revenue and ￿ ￿ r is the loss of revenue due to non compliance. We
assume that the market faces incomplete information on the true status of any individual but
observes convictions. Hence, if the market anticipates a compliance rate ￿, then the revenue
4R that any non convicted individual gets is given by
R = (r ￿ ￿)Pr(not compliant j not convicted) + rPr(compliant j not convicted)
=
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p) + ￿￿(1 ￿ p)
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(1 ￿ p)
(r ￿ ￿) +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿(1 ￿ p)
r
= r ￿
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ p)
1 ￿ p + ￿p(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ 2 (r ￿ ￿;r):
Note that R is increasing in ￿ (with lim￿!1 R = r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)=(1 ￿ ￿p)), is decreasing in ￿
(with lim￿!1 R = r ￿ ￿) and is increasing in p (with limp!1 R = r).
Besides market sanctions, the non compliant individual also su⁄ers from a psychic cost
or social sanction due to illegal behavior equal to ￿ (￿) where ￿ ￿ 0 denotes the individual
adherence to the norm and where  (:) is increasing in the rate of compliance. An extreme
case is where ￿ = 0 so that such an individual does not su⁄er at all from social sanctions
in case of compliance. The higher ￿ is, the more reluctant to non compliance the agent is.
This phenomenon is reinforced by the presence of a positive externality of ￿ through the
function   on the social sanction. The social sanction is higher when the compliance rate is
large in the population. We assume that this social sanction appears only in cases where non
compliance is voluntary.
We are now in a position to derive the expected payo⁄s relative to a compliance or non
compliance decision. A type-(￿;c) individual who chooses compliance gets an expected payo⁄
equal to
(1 ￿ ￿p)U(R(￿) ￿ c) + ￿pU(V ￿ f ￿ c)
where U(:) is an increasing utility fonction of net monetary revenue.1 Similarly, a type-(￿;c)
who chooses non compliance gets
pU(V ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿)) ￿ ￿ (￿):
1If one were unable to distinguish voluntary from unvoluntary non compliance, then the expected payo⁄
of a compliant agent would write
(1 ￿ ￿p)U(R(￿) ￿ c) + ￿pU(V ￿ F ￿ c) ￿ ￿￿ (￿):
53 The equilibrium rate of compliance
If each individual chooses the alternative with the highest expected utility, then compliance
is optimal for a type-(￿;c) individual if and only if:
(1 ￿ ￿p)U(R(￿) ￿ c) + ￿pU(V ￿ f ￿ c) > pU(V ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿)) ￿ ￿ (￿);
or equivalently




￿W(c;￿) = pU(V ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿p)U(R(￿) ￿ c) ￿ ￿pU(V ￿ f ￿ c)
is the expected utility gain from being non compliant as compared with compliance.
The following lemma indicates the basic properties of the minimal adherence to the norm
~ ￿(c;￿), needed for compliance to be optimal.
Lemma 1 The minimal adherence to the norm ~ ￿(c;￿) is continuous, decreasing in the com-
pliance rate ￿ and increasing in the compliance cost c:








  ￿  0￿W
￿









because 1 ￿ ￿p ￿ 1 ￿ p and U0(R ￿ c) > U0(R) as U is concave.





= signf(1 ￿ ￿p)U0(R(￿) ￿ c) + ￿pU0(V ￿ f ￿ c)g =
+. This concludes the proof.
Intuitively, the minimal adherence to the norm for compliance to be chosen must be higher
when the compliance cost c increases. Furthermore, this threshold level decreases with the
6rate of compliance ￿ as an increase in the compliance rate increases both the social norm and
the market revenue e⁄ects. Indeed, the expected utility gain of non compliance ￿W(c;￿)
decreases in ￿ because of the market revenue e⁄ect. The following lemma indicates some
further comparative results for ￿W(c;￿).
Lemma 2 The expected utility gain of non compliance ￿W(c;￿)
(i) is increasing in the penalty f for unvoluntary non compliance and the probability ￿ of
unvoluntary non compliance;
(ii) is decreasing in the penalty F for voluntary non compliance,
(iii) varies ambiguously with the loss ￿ in market revenue if non compliant, under the as-
sumption of risk aversion
(iv) varies ambiguously with the probability p of being inspected, as long as the probability of
unvoluntary non compliance ￿ is strictly positive.
Proof: First, we have
@￿W
@f









+ p[U(R ￿ c) ￿ U(V ￿ f ￿ c)] > 0
because @￿W
@R < 0, @R




= ￿pU0(V ￿ F) < 0




















(1 ￿ p)U0(R) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿p)U0(R ￿ c)
￿ @R
@￿
7Recalling that both V and R decrease in ￿, we still have that @￿W
@R < 0 while @￿W
@V is
ambiguous in general. In the special case where ￿ = 0, then @￿W
@V > 0 and the sign of
@￿W
@￿ is a priori ambiguous. We now prove that the ambiguity disappears if one makes the
risk-neutrality assumption (as in Rasmussen 1996). Indeed, under risk neutrality, we have
@￿W
@￿
= [p ￿ ￿p]
@V
@￿
+ [(1 ￿ p) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿p)]
@R
@￿
















@￿ = ￿1 ￿ @R
@￿ ￿ 0. This proves (iii).
Finally, with regards to p, we get
@￿W
@p





+ ￿[U(R ￿ c) ￿ U(V ￿ f ￿ c)]
The two ￿rst terms are non positive because R > V and @R
@p > 0 together with @￿W
@R < 0.
In the last term, the expression between the brackets is positive as R > V: This proves the
ambiguity of the sign of @￿W
@p and thereby part (iv).
Parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 2 yield to expected results. If the probability and the penalty
for unvoluntary non compliance increase then non compliance appears to be increasingly a
better strategy than compliance. On the contrary, an increase in the penalty for voluntary
non compliance reduces the utility gain of non compliance. More surprising are the last two
results (parts (iii) and (iv)). Part (iii) suggests that the market loss ￿ has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on ￿W and hence on ~ ￿. Indeed, it is easy to construct examples where @￿W
@￿ > 0 that
is where the gain to be non compliant increases with the market loss. In turn, the threshold
~ ￿ increases too. As shown by Lemma 2 this result comes from the non linearity of the utility
function under the assumption of risk aversion. Last, part (iv) indicates that an increase in
the inspection probability p may yield to an increase in the utility gain of non compliance
and hence a similar pattern for the threshold ~ ￿(c;￿). As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, this
phenomenon is purely due to the fact that ￿ > 0 and expresses the fact that when compliance
8is stochastic and ￿ su¢ ciently large ceteris paribus then an increase in p may favor the non
compliance strategy.
Having characterized the basic properties of the crucial variables ~ ￿ and ￿W, we now
turn to the determination of the equilibrium rate of compliance. We denote G(￿;c) the
joint distribution of the adherence to the norm and the compliance cost, on the product
of their respective supports. We assume that all individuals simultaneously choose between
compliance and non compliance for given parameters (p;￿;f;F;r;￿). If all individuals expect
a compliance rate equal to ￿, then ￿ must be equal to the population share H(￿) that ￿nds
compliance as being optimal. We thus obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 An equilibrium rate of compliance exists and is de￿ned by a ￿xed point of:






From Lemma 1, it follows that H(:) is a continuous non decreasing function of ￿, mapping
the interval [0;1] into itself. Hence, there exists at least one compliance rate satisfying equa-
tion (1) for any policy (p;f;F). This follows from the intermediate value theorem applied to
f(￿) = ￿￿H(￿) which is a continuous function with f(0) ￿ 0 and f(1) ￿ 0. However, multi-
plicity of equilibria is possible and it is actually a general feature of this class of models with
aggregate externality (see e.g. Weibull and Villa 2005 or Lindbeck et al., 1999). Equilibria
may be stable or unstable.
Given the results contained in Lemma 2, it is not surprising that it is easy to ￿nd exemples
where an increase in the audit probability p or in the market loss ￿ nevertheless induce a
decrease in equilibrium rate of compliance, whether it is stable or not. [to be completed]
4 The role of information
We examine in the following the crucial role of information provided to the market. For
simplicity, we concentrate on the case where social norms are absent and we successively
analyze the impact of self-reporting and public disclosure of information.
9In the particular situation where there is absence of social norms (￿ = 0), then there
exists a unique value ~ c(￿) such that if c ￿ ~ c(￿) then a type-c ￿rm chooses to be compliant.
The threshold value ~ c(￿) is increasing in ￿ and is de￿ned implicitly by
(1 ￿ ￿p)U(R(￿) ￿ ~ c(￿)) + ￿pU(V ￿ f ￿ ~ c(￿)) = pU(V ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿))





Note that in the absence of social norms, then compliance is possible only if f < F.
Otherwise, no individual would ￿nd an interest in being compliant. Hence, it is necessary for
the regulator to observe whether c has been spent in order to distinguish between voluntary
and unvoluntary non compliance.
Let us look at how ~ c(￿) varies with ￿. Di⁄erentiating, we get
￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿p)U0(R(￿) ￿ ~ c(￿)) + ￿pU0(V ￿ f ￿ ~ c(￿))
￿ d~ c
d￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿p)U0(R(￿) ￿ ~ c(￿))
@R
@￿
+ ￿pU0(V ￿ f ￿ ~ c(￿))
@V
@￿
￿ pU0(V ￿ F)
@V
@￿




Thus the sign of d~ c
d￿ is given by the sign of (1 ￿ ￿p)U0(R(￿) ￿ ~ c(￿))@R




@￿ , which is ambiguous as shown above, because
of risk aversion.
4.1 The impact of self-reporting
If one allows self-reporting as part of the mechanism, then an individual has always the
option to declare his status (compliant/non compliant) before being inspected at random. If
he declares to be non compliant, we assume that the individual will pay a sanction s ￿ f
with probability one if c has been spent and S ￿ F if c has not been spent. Hence, if an
individual is non compliant because he has not spent c, he declares his status if and only if
U(V ￿ S) > pU(V ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿)):
10Note that this inequality does not depend on the cost of compliance, c. This means that
all individuals voluntarily non compliant and sharing the same preferences U(:) will take the
same decision whatever their private cost of compliance. Suppose for now that ￿ = 0 so that
unvoluntary non compliance does not exist. Then, the situation where self-reporting appears
at the equilibrium is such that all non compliant individuals declare their status. Otherwise,
we would be back to the case in which there is no self-reporting. Consequently, a type-c
individual chooses to comply if and only if,
U(R(￿) ￿ c) > U(V ￿ S)
where R = r and V = r￿￿. Indeed, the direct consequence of truthtelling by all non compliant
individuals is that the market faces no more asymmetric information. The threshold level is
given by R(￿) ￿ c = V ￿ S or equivalently by ~ c = ￿ + S and consequently, there exists an
unique equilibrium compliance rate give by ￿ = G(0;￿ + S). We thus obtain the following
result.
Proposition 4 Assume that non compliance can only be voluntary, i.e. ￿ = 0. Whenever
self-reporting appears at the equilibrium, it implies complete information for the market and
thereby selects an unique equilibrium compliance rate. Consequently, introducing the possibil-
ity of self-reporting yields ambiguous welfare results.
Indeed, introducing self-reporting is ambiguous from a welfare point of view as we may
select an equilibrium with a lower compliance rate than the one we get before. And conversely.
Now consider the situation where unvoluntary non compliance exists, i.e. ￿ > 0. An
individual who is unvoluntarily non compliant chooses to declare his status if and only if
U(V ￿ s ￿ c) > pU(V ￿ f ￿ c) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿) ￿ c): (2)
Note ￿rst that if f = s, ie there is no rebate for truthtelling, then the inequality simply
becomes
U(V ￿ f ￿ c) > U(R(￿) ￿ c)
11and the decision is now independent of c. Moreover as V < R(￿) then nobody will declare
his status. Hence we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 A rebate for truthtelling is necessary for unvoluntary non compliance to be
declared, i.e. s < f.
Let us examine the inequality (2) more closely:
U(V ￿ s ￿ c) > pU(V ￿ f ￿ c) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿) ￿ c)
V ￿ s ￿ c > U￿1 [pU(V ￿ f ￿ c) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿) ￿ c)]
c + U￿1 [pU(V ￿ f ￿ c) + (1 ￿ p)U(R(￿) ￿ c)] < V ￿ s
The LHS of this inequality is non monotonic in c so that the set of values for c such that the
inequality is satis￿ed is ambiguous at this level of generality.
4.2 The impact of information public disclosure
In the absence of public information on criminal records, the market forms beliefs so that the
expected revenue for any individual is given by
RNPI(￿) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)r + (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(r ￿ ￿)
= r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿
where NPI stands for non public information. Note that RNPI(￿) > V = r ￿ ￿. Also RNPI
does not depend on p. Moreover, we have RNPI(￿) < R(￿): Indeed,
R(￿) ￿ RNPI(￿) = r ￿
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ p)
1 ￿ p + ￿p(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ r + (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿
=
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ p)
1 ￿ p + ￿p(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
= ￿p(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ p + ￿p(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿ ￿ 0:
Hence, if criminal records are non public, the expected market revenue is lower than the
expected market revenue under public criminal records and non conviction.
12Hence, the decision of being compliant is taken if and only if
(1￿￿p)U(RNPI(￿)￿c)+￿pU(RNPI(￿)￿f ￿c) > pU(RNPI(￿)￿F)+(1￿p)U(RNPI(￿))
Let us denote ^ c(￿) the marginal individual indi⁄erent between being compliant or not:
(1￿￿p)U(RNPI(￿)￿^ c(￿))+￿pU(RNPI(￿)￿f￿^ c(￿)) = pU(RNPI(￿)￿F)+(1￿p)U(RNPI(￿))





Note that when ￿ = 0, then RNPI(0) = R(0) = V = r ￿ ￿: Hence, ^ c(0) = ~ c(0). This means
that the two curves start from the same point.
Proposition 6 Under risk neutrality, in the absence of public information on criminal records,
there is an unique equilibrium compliance rate given by ￿NPI = G(0;p(F ￿￿f)) while under
public information there are potentially multiple equilibria. Hence, there exists some circum-
stances where hiding criminal records from the public￿ s eye might increase the equilibrium
compliance rate.
Proof: Under risk neutrality, ^ c(￿) is given by
(1 ￿ ￿p)(RNPI(￿) ￿ ^ c(￿)) + ￿p(RNPI(￿) ￿ f ￿ ^ c(￿)) = p(RNPI(￿) ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)(RNPI(￿))
which simpli￿es into ^ c(￿) = p(F ￿ ￿f):
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